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ABSTRACT China has actively implemented an industrial policy during the last two
decades. However, despite important progress, the overall result is rather disappointing.
Should China continue to pursue industrial policy? Should China focus instead on devel-
oping successful globally competitive firms within the global value chain? This paper,
based on an in-depth case study on the Shenhua Group, which has been deliberately built
as an indigenous globally competitive coal corporation, argues that it is still possible for
China to build powerful big businesses in some sectors. However, a well-designed industrial
policy is necessary.
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Introduction
China officially first designated 55 enterprise groups in 1991 to trial the building
of indigenous competitive groups, and then expanded this number to 120 by 1997.
In addition, 300 enterprises were selected as key enterprises to be supported by the
central government in 1996, and this number was subsequently increased to 520
by 1999. These groups and enterprises are collectively known as the ‘national
team’ and are considered to be the mainstay in their respective sectors and the
national economy as a whole (SC, 1991, 1997; CESRY, 2001).
There is a list of active industrial policies to support these key groups and enter-
prises: extensive support from the banking sector; shelter from international com-
petition behind a wall of protective tariff and non-tariff barriers; an independent
accounting system, which removed the barriers between different sectors, depart-
ments and regions; permission for the establishment of internal group finance com-
panies; the granting of import and export rights; rights to establish international
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joint ventures, and rights to float a share of equity on national and international
stock markets (CSSA, 2001, 2002; Nolan, 2001; SPC, 1996, 1999).
After over a decade of effort, the overall result is rather disappointing despite
important progress. By 2002 there were 11 Chinese companies in the Fortune
Global 500, ranked by value of sales (Fortune, 22 July 2002). However, as Fortune
comments, ‘Chinese companies still account for less than 2% of Global 500 rev-
enues. . . . All 11 companies remain state-owned, and overmanning is still rife. The
oil giant Sinopec (No. 86) needs 937,000 employees to generate $40 billion in rev-
enues, while Exxon’s 97,900 employees bring in $192 billion.’ What Fortune does
not point out is that China’s most successful large firms, the State Power, China
Telecom, China Mobile, PetroChina and Sinopec, all operate behind high pro-
tectionist barriers and their operations are mainly confined to the domestic market.
China’s industrial policy has failed to create globally competitive ‘national cham-
pions’ on a large-scale. There seem to be more and more reasons for the Chinese
government to give up its industrial policy. First, the mainstream view in devel-
opment economics believes that undistorted prices, competitive markets and free
entry for small firms, rather than big business and controlled markets, are the
keys to development. Second, this epoch has seen truly global corporations being
created, making the task of catching up for firms based in developing countries
even more difficult. Third, even if China wished to continue its industrial policy,
it would be much more difficult than before, due to joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Any given country’s decision to implement an active industrial policy depends
on both industrial needs and government capacity. This paper, based on an
in-depth case study of the Shenhua Group Corporation Limited (hereafter
Shenhua), aims to provide evidence of the needs and possibilities of China’s ability
to build indigenous globally competitive companies. The next section shows that
even in the outmoded coal industry, the global big business revolution has created
a new breed of even more powerful super-large internationally competitive com-
panies, which have created an enormous challenge for China. The section after shows
that, simultaneously, by joining the WTO, China’s weak state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and tens of thousands of township and village owned enterprises (TVEs)
will have to compete face-to-face with the global giants. The fourth section provides
evidence that China is still capable of building a powerful big business provided
a well-designed and active industrial policy is in position.
Business Revolution, Global Value Chain, and Concentration
in the Coal Industry
The Global Big Business Revolution
Instead of an epoch of national champions and conglomerates, the business struc-
ture of advanced economies has been revolutionized since the late 1980s. With the
forces of the collapse of Communism, privatization, trade and capital flow liberal-
ization, and new information technology, by the late 1990s there was a very high
degree of firm concentration on a global scale in a wide range of sectors (Nolan,
2001, pp. 134–50).
The revolution has brought a dramatic growth in the business capability of
the major international companies, through concentrating on their core busi-
ness, enhancing their brand names, and massive spending on R&D and IT. Global
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mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rose from less than $300 billion in 1992 to around
$3500 billion in 2000. The concentration process was inexorable, permeating
almost every sector. Firm after firm shed non-core business in order to focus on
the areas in which the firm could compete globally, which has resulted in a small
number of firms accounting for over one-half of the global sales in numerous
sectors, from the extremely high-tech sector of aerospace, which is dominated
by Boeing and Airbus, to the less high-tech sector of coal, whose international
market is dominated by BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Anglo American.
The Global Value Chain Cascade Effect on Developing Countries
The business revolution is relevant to this paper through its impact on developing
countries such as China. Introducing a new concept of the global value chain
cascade effect would be helpful in examining such an impact.
A value chain is a systematically coordinated production and delivery process,
comprising all the steps leading to an ultimate ‘downstream’ sale from the initial
‘upstream’ raw material processing. As business internationalizes, value chains
are lengthening, extending across borders and drawing in more firms. However,
global companies have also become more effective supply chain coordinators,
with the aim of meeting customers’ needs, minimizing costs, maximizing market
share and profit, or strengthening strategic control.
Giant or core companies, acting as ‘systems integrators’, penetrate the global
value chain deeply, both upstream and downstream. They are closely involved in
business activities that range from long-term planning to meticulous control of
day-to-day production and delivery schedules. This has created an explosive ‘cas-
cade’ effect on suppliers, causing rapid restructuring among first, second and
even third tier suppliers, working across sectors and between developed and devel-
oping countries. For example, the intense competition and consolidation among
automobile makers forced the consolidation of their supply companies, including
those providing components and steel; and the liberalization and high-speed con-
solidation in the global steel and electricity markets promoted consolidation
among their suppliers, including those providing iron ore and coal. In most sectors
of the entire value chain, there is an ever-larger sphere of coordination and planning
of the entire value chain orchestrated by the core systems integrators.
As a result, the boundaries of the large corporation have become blurred. The
more the indigenous firms join the global value chain as either suppliers or cus-
tomers, the more multinational companies (MNCs) relocate as joint ventures or
independent firms, the deeper and broader the global value chain will impact
host countries through the unitary planning of the ‘system integrators’. In other
words, the national interests of the host countries may become downgraded in rela-
tion to corporate interests, and policy makers in developing countries may well have
to consider carefully both the role of indigenous firms within the global value chain
and the national economic security.
Consolidation in the Coal Sector during the Big Business Revolution
People typically associate the concept of big business with sectors such as the avia-
tion and automobile industries, but regard the coal industry as a declining business.
However, the big business revolution is affecting even this sector. Coal remains
one of the most important sources of primary energy. Global hard (black) coal
The Chinese Coal Industry 99
New trim(248174) (V 7.51g) [6.4.2004–2:04pm] [97–113] [Page No. 99] {TandF}Rcea/RCEA-02_02_01.3d (RCEA) RCEA-02_02_01
production has grown by almost 50% in the last 25 years to 3834 million tonnes
(Mt) in 2001. By 2002 coal still accounts for 23% of the world’s primary energy
consumption, and 39% of electricity fuel and 70% of global steel production
depend on coal feedstock (WCI, 2003). Known coal reserves worldwide are thought
likely to last for 250 years at current levels of consumption, much longer than the
life expectancy of oil reserves.
Compared with the institutional changes under way in most other industries, the
coal industry still lags behind in terms of global consolidation. However, the speed
of consolidation is still remarkable. In the late 1990s, M&A in the coal sector grew
to record levels, reaching $17 billion in 1995, rising to a new peak of $26 billion in
1998. However, in 2001, the process scaled new heights. The BHP/Billion merger
alone was valued at $31.1 billion (Financial Times, 24 March 2001; The Sunday
Times, 25 March 2001). Following the rapid growth of M&A, the future of the inter-
national coal trading industry is seen as ‘an oligopoly with interests in the three main
exporting centres, South Africa, Central America and Australia’ (Financial Times,
6 September 2000). The market has been controlled by a small number of power-
ful international mining companies: Rio Tinto, Anglo American, BHP/Billiton with
over 62% of the total internationally traded coal in 2001 (Table 1). Each of them is
still actively pursuing a policy of M&A.
The competitive advantage in the global coal industry lies primarily in size and
management skills. Size enables international outreach and the construction of
a set of low-cost coal-mines across the world. This reduces risk, and ensures loca-
tion within or close to each major market. Successful global firms also enjoy the
financial resources to purchase mines, invest in exploration and evaluation of
resources, negotiate with governments, deal with complex land rights and environ-
mental issues, apply best practice across the whole mining business, integrate their
global mining operations within a single global marketing system, and thus they are
able to force down costs more successfully than smaller local companies. Most
global coal companies are not simply coal companies. Rather, they operate diversi-
fied operations focused on mining products. Their size and capital advantages
enable them to adjust themselves to business shift (Financial Times, 21 May 2001).
The BHP/Billiton merger was pursued precisely in order to enhance the firm’s
competitive advantage:
The companies balance each other well, with an exceptional breadth of
assets and capabilities which have taken many years to develop! This
merger brings together some of the world’s finest mining, metals and
energy assets under a dynamic and unified executive team. Few, if any, of
our competitors will be better placed to serve the commodity requirements
of our diverse customer base. The financial strength, international scope,
and enhanced project skills of the combined group should bring major
new growth opportunities internationally. (www.ft.com, 18 March 2001).
Two years later, with these advantages, BHP Billiton has become an industry leader
or a near-leader in aluminium, metallurgical coal, sea-borne steaming coal, copper,
ferro alloys, iron ore and titanium minerals (BHP Billiton, 2003).
Entering 2002, the world economy was in recession. However, the coal busi-
ness exceptionally was enjoying prosperity. Following its acquisition of Glencore
International AG’s Australian and South African coal business in the first quarter
of 2002, Xstrata was fast becoming one of the world’s largest export thermal coal
producers, with a capacity of 70Mt of coal output per year (Xstrata, 2003).
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Table 1. Major indices of the world’s and China’s leading coal companies in 2002 (Mt, m$US)
Coal
Out-put
Global
traded
coal (1)
Market
capitalisation
(b$) (2)
Employee
(3)
Turn-over Net earnings
(4)
Production locations Products
Rio Tinto 149 149 (26.7%) 13.2 36,141
(5,550)
10,828
(351)
651 Australia, South Pacific,
Europe,
North America,
South America,
Indonesia
Iron ore, coal, copper,
industrial minerals,
aluminium,
diamonds & gold
BHP Billiton 120 120 (23%) 32.9 51,037
(18,496)
17, 800
(536)
1,900 South Africa, Europe,
Latin America,
Australia
Aluminium, petroleum,
base metals, coal, ferroalloys,
diamond and speciality, (steel
was de-merged in 2002)
Anglo American 64.8 61.8 (11.9%) 21.8 185,000
(10,000)
20,497
(1,710)
1,563 South Africa,
Rest of Africa,
Europe, North
and South America,
Australia, Asia
and Middle East
Forest products, industrial
minerals, diamonds, platinum,
gold, industries, coal,
base metals, ferrous metals,
iron ore
Shenhua 77 20 11 90,000
(9,716)
3,110 382 China Coal, electricity,
(oil products by 2005)
Yanzhou 38 14 2.8 82,000 1,361 147 China Coal, coal water mixture,
urea, methanol products
Notes: (1) The data for the top three global companies were those of 2001. The global coal trade was 625Mt in 2001. The figures in brackets refer to the percentage shares
of the global traded coal for each company.
(2) The capitalizations for the three global giants refer to the data on 31 December 2002, 30 June 2002, and 31 December 2002 respectively. For China’s coal companies, the
figures refer to their assets.
(3) The figures in brackets refer to the employees dedicated to coal business. (4) Net earning¼ profit after taxation.
Sources: Annual Reports, various years for each company; Osiris (2003).
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WTO Accession and the Diseconomy of China’s Coal Industry
Joining the WTO will Force China to ‘Dance with Wolves’
The previous section analysed the global big business revolution, which has created
giant international firms. During the same period, China was claming admittance
to the WTO. To gain admittance, China agreed to dismantle almost the entire
range of mechanisms that has formed the core of industrial policy in the past two
decades, as a succession of countries have supported the growth of large indigenous
corporations.
The Chinese government was well aware of the deficiencies of its firms in
worldwide competition as early as in 1996:
Our industry structure improvement will be implemented in a more open
and competitive global environment. The reduced trade tariff after enter-
ing the WTO will make our market more open to the outside and incur
more intensive international competition into the domestic market. We
must face the fact that in capital and technology intensive industrial sec-
tors, not only do we have a weak base and low starting point, but more
importantly, our competitive advantage of labor intensive industry will
cease to be an advantage. . . . If global giants control our market, most of
our firms will be heavily disadvantaged, and our economic growth will
likely be ousted by market constraints. Therefore, speeding the develop-
ment of big business is vital for our survival, and also a strategic task
which ensures the security of national industry. (SPC, 1996, pp. 6–7)
These severe concerns are grounded on the complete understanding of the fact
that diseconomy of scale is a common problem for almost all Chinese industrial sec-
tors. China’s coal industry offers a prime illustration of how severe the problems are
which resulted from the lack of economies of scale domestically and from the global
big business consolidation. It is well known that coal has held a special position
in China. China is the world’s largest coal producer and consumer. Coal output
grew from 618Mt in 1978 to 1.4 billion tons in 2002 (Table 2). Coal still accounts
Table 2. China’s coal production 1978–2002 (Mt)
Year National
Total
Key SOE Local SOE TVE
Output Output Ratio (%) Output Ratio (%) Output Ratio (%)
1978 617.86 341.84 55.33 180.7 29.25 95.32 15.43
1980 620.4 344.39 55.51 162.39 26.18 113.6 18.31
1985 872.28 406.26 46.57 182.78 20.95 283.2 32.47
1990 1,079.88 480.22 44.47 205.09 18.99 389.7 36.09
1995 1,360.73 482.28 35.44 213.35 15.68 665.1 48.88
2000 951.06 528.15 55.53 191.28 20.11 201.63 21.20
2001 1105.49 618.48 56 223.16 20 263.85 24
2002 1393.35 711.63 51 263.45 19 418.27 30
Note: Adding the three ratios of key SOEs, local SOEs and TVEs might be not equal to 100, because of
the tiny ratio of other categories of coal producers.
Sources: (1) SPC (1997, p. 131); (2) CCIY (1999); (3) SCA (2001, p. 1; 2003); (4) Ye & Zhang (1998,
pp. 401–402).
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for 68% of China’s primary energy production and consumption and generates over
80% of the country’s electricity. China produced 137Mt of coking coal in 2001,
ranking first in the world, to supply the world’s largest steel production.
Furthermore, self-sufficiency in coal, electricity and steel has recently enabled
China to become the centre of the world’s manufacturing industry.2
Such an important industry was nonetheless the principal loss maker among
China’s industrial sectors until 2001 (except in 1997). A mass of evidence attests
to the low level of efficiency and financial difficulties, rooted in severe diseconomies
of scale and scope.
Before 1978, 85% of China’s coal was produced by state-owned coal companies
(SOEs), including 104 key SOE coal bureaus and fewer than 2000 local SOE coal
producers. However, after the mid 1980s, with encouragement from central gov-
ernment, township and village owned coal-mines (TVEs) developed dramatically,
reaching 72,000 in 1996, resulting in a huge change of the ownership structure in
which state and non-state each share half (Figure 1). Table 3 shows that before
the government’s closure policy started in 1998, the average output per company
in China was only about 17,101 tons. After the closure policy, the average output
for China’s coal companies was increased to 50,000 tons by 2002. The market
share of the largest 10 coal producers increased from 13 in 1997 to 21% in 2001,
compared with the US in 2001 when the top five coal producers accounted for
51% of total US coal production (NMA, 2003). Among China’s coal companies,
Table 3. Size structure change of China’s coal producers 1998–2002
Numbers of
producer
Total Output
(Mt)
Average Output
per producer (tons)
% of national
output
1998 2002 (1) 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002
National Total 72,042 27,666 1,232 1,393 17,101 50,000 100 100
Large/medium SOEs
(>450,000t)
448 283 449 712 1Mt 2.5Mt 36 51
Small SOEs
(30,000–450,000t)
1,794 2,383 172 263 96,000 110,365 14 19
TVEs/small SOEs
(<30,000t)
69,800 25,000 612 418 8,800 16,720 50 30
Notes: (1) Data for large/medium SOEs and small SOEs were those of 2000.
Sources: SCA (2003); SSB (2001, pp. 48, 80); Yan et al. (2000, p. 28).
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Figure 1. The ratio of production between key SOE, local SOE and TVE 1979–2000.
Sources: (1) SPC (1997, p. 131); (2) CCIY (1999); (3) SCA (2001, p. 1); (4) Ye & Zhang
(1998, pp. 401–402)
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‘none has significant market share and none could influence market competition’
(SCA, 2000, p. 5). Moreover, few coal companies have dedicated rail, port and
power plants, leading to high transaction cost and placing coal companies in a
very disadvantaged position.
This sort of diseconomy of scale and scope has inevitably caused excessive
competition, extremely scattered capital and technical investment, a chaotic coal
market, depressed coal prices, low productivity, and large scale loss-making.
Figure 2 shows a typical example where the difficulties of rail access for coal
firms increased by over as much as four times the cost of their production.
More importantly, dispersed capital and excessive competition also obstruct
technological progress and the capacity to merge among enterprises. Excess com-
petition prevents most SOEs from producing at full capacity so that making a loss
is inevitable, and mergers impossible (for lack of strength). Moreover, too many
producers from various regions, provinces and government departments, local
and sector interests block M&A among themselves.
While China’s coal industry suffers from diseconomy of scale and scope domes-
tically, the international coal giants have recently gained strength through an unpar-
alleled process of consolidation (as seen in section 2), and are accelerating their
entry into China. The rate at which multinational coal companies are entering
China is much faster, and the threat to indigenous firms is more intense than
expected.
During the relatively short period of the past two or three years, all the global
mining giants, including BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Anglo American, and CVRD
1. 39.80 for out-of-
Shanxi from HCC 
Mine
2. 12-16 
trucking costs 3. 25 to access
railhead at Datong
5. 10 from national to local 
rail+load/unload+other 
Tanggu Station-storage
6. self-hire/ or pay usage fee 
to storage
(200,000yuan/year/10,000 m2 )
7. 4-16 from storage 
to dock at Tianjin 
Port
8. 5+6+7+ other port service fees=
40 charged at Tianjin Port
Administration
9. tariff if go overseas 
10.$2-3/t shipping to South 
East China /overseas 
customers 
4. 90 for railway 
Datong-Tanggu Station
11. Customers
at destination 
Figure 2. Costs from Datong of Shanxi province to Tianjin Port for coal producers ( yuan/
ton) Notes: (1) The total cost for HCC Mine (a TVE mine) was at least 220.8 yuan/ton,
compared to its production cost of 40 yuan/ton in 2000. (2) The difference between costs
for SOE coal and TVE coal was that SOE coal producers did not need to pay categories of
1, 2 and 3 as they had their own rail connecting them to the national rail network. Source:
Interview sources.
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have not only arrived in China, but have completed preparation work and started
to ‘take action’. This action is based on the beliefs that China is the ‘final frontier’
for their business success and that China’s coal market is too big to neglect. One
confidential report from a global mining company stated: ‘Foreign players need
to secure their positions in the market early to ensure access to attractive opportu-
nities, as there will only be a selective few players that will emerge as industry lea-
ders’. Concurrently, the Chinese government, in November 2002, granted foreign
mining companies the right to extract coal in China. The world’s leading companies
are actively engaged in establishing joint ventures in order to save time and costs in
mine and rail building, and to acquire local market knowledge. The government
has established few special conditions for foreign firms in respect of tax and resource
access. Therefore, joint ventures in this sector will truly compete with domestic
companies on a level playing field in both the home and international markets.
The threat from the MNCs is reflected not only in the fact that the international
mining giants may compete in China’s domestic and exporting markets, but also in
many other aspects. Although the tariff cut on coal (from the current 6 to 3% only
by 2005) resulting from China’s joining the WTO was assumed not to be signifi-
cant, the liberalization of non-tariff regulations was believed to result in more
imports of coal and coal equipment. In 2002, coal import to China increased to
10Mt from 2.49Mt in 2001, which led to the price reduction of the domestic
Qinghuangdao benchmark to the detriment of the domestic coal producers. In addi-
tion, both tariff cuts on imported oil and gas, as well as environmental concerns,
may result in more oil and gas being imported to attract former coal users.
Finally, as a result of a cascade effect of the global value chain stated above, the
relocation of the MNCs inmanufacturingwill well impact domestic coal companies
on quality, price, and service.
To avoid the fate of being merged, acquired or closed, China’s coal companies
need to run their own large efficient mining businesses in order to achieve econ-
omies of scale, to produce a competitive price and high quality of coal, and to
withstand intensified global competition.
Building Big Business by Industrial Policy rather than by Market Forces
If China is to develop its own globally competitive big business, should it wait for
firms to emerge spontaneously from free market competition, or actively build
them through a well-designed industrial policy? According to the mainstream
view, the market mechanism should allow free entry and exit for small firms, with
the ‘winners’ emerging naturally through market competition. In the absence of
such a free competitive market, as in the case of a socialist economy, privatization
is regarded as the primary task of the ‘transition’. Restructuring should be left to
the new private owners. State-led industrial restructuring, including building big
business, is considered to be unnecessary and undesirable.
However, the case of China’s coal industry has demonstrated a rather opposite
truth. Our case studies on the bankruptcy of certain large SOE coal bureaus demon-
strate the unfeasibility of their rapid privatization in the specific institutional setting
of China’s transitional economy. In China’s coal industry, although no large SOEs
have been privatized, 50 large SOE coal companies or mines were forced into bank-
ruptcy in 1999 and 2000, and a further 220 SOE coal-mines will be going bankrupt
by 2005 (CCC, 2000). These bankruptcy cases provided a clear indication of the
unfeasibility for their privatization.
The Chinese Coal Industry 105
New trim(248174) (V 7.51g) [6.4.2004–2:05pm] [97–113] [Page No. 105] {TandF}Rcea/RCEA-02_02_01.3d (RCEA) RCEA-02_02_01
The first critical problem encountered by the ‘Bankruptcy Working Group’ was
that China’s Bankruptcy Law ( pochan fa) (1986) gave no guidance about a case
such as this. The Law applied only to ‘legal persons’ such as the SOE coal
bureau rather than mines, but many of the proposed bankrupted objectives were
mines while their affiliated coal bureaus were kept alive. In addition, China’s coal
industry had never before had a case of bankruptcy, so there was no precedent.
Therefore, the Group had to find an innovative way to deal with the new problems.
The second problem was that of financing the huge bankruptcy costs, including
writing-off the banks’ bad debts, one-off payments for redundancy, and subsidies
to the local government for social security payments for redundant workers.
There were only two possible sources of funds: the central government and the
sale of the assets resulting from the bankrupted mines. However, it proved difficult
to sell the assets because no one wanted to buy assets of an assumed declining
industry in an often remote part of China. The price that could be obtained from
asset sales was therefore disappointingly low. In some cases, the Working Group
calculated that cash from the sale of assets would cover only 15% of the total bank-
ruptcy cost. The central government did not have the financial resources to meet the
remaining 85%.
The third problem was that many of the coal bureaus’ liabilities had been trans-
ferred to the balance sheet of the coal-mines that were ready for bankruptcy. This
was connected to the fourth problem, namely the absence of a neutral and fair
auditing and legal process. This made it possible to falsify company accounts.
The final problem was that the bankruptcy caused the rapid growth in the
numbers of redundant workers. It was reported that during the ninth Five-year Plan
(1996–2000) there were about one million employees dismissed in China’s SOE
coal sector, reducing the total number of employees to about three million. No gov-
ernment, facing the threat of social turbulence, can neglect so many redundancies.
All the problems stemming from this bankruptcy case may very likely emerge
during the process of privatization. If bankruptcy is so difficult, one should not
expect privatization to be easy. If privatization is difficult, then waiting for big
business to result from privatization becomes problematic and costly. Being aware
of the possible difficulties, China started to privatize SOEs from as late as 1997 when
the people’s basic living standard was secured. Nevertheless, privatization in the
coal industry has mainly been conducted in small SOEs owing to the huge
difficulties of privatization for the large SOEs.
Most significantly, many industries are too important for the government to
allow them to develop without industrial policy guidance. In the case of the coal
industry, the strategic significance is reflected in the fact of China’s severe shortage
of oil and high reliance on coal. Coal becomes even more crucially important after
the government implements the coal liquefaction project (see below). Keeping
state ownership of the most important coal companies might be the major advantage
for the government to control and guide the industry to serve the nation’s strategic
energy needs.
The Shenhua Group: Can China Build Internationally
Competitive Big Businesses?
This section uses the example of the Shenhua Group to substantiate the claim
that China can build large globally competitive firms based on the government’s
comprehensive policy support.
106 P. Nolan & H. Rui
New trim(248174) (V 7.51g) [6.4.2004–2:05pm] [97–113] [Page No. 106] {TandF}Rcea/RCEA-02_02_01.3d (RCEA) RCEA-02_02_01
China’s ambition to build globally competitive big businesses in the coal sector
has been pursued explicitly since the 1990s. Although this sector is still highly frag-
mented, it has also made significant progress as a direct consequence of the govern-
ment’s active industrial policy. As one of the key trial enterprise groups, Shenhua
has been built from zero in 1985 to its current position as one of the most important
competitive coal corporations in the world. The speed of development can be seen
from Table 4. The degree to which the government is able to utilize China’s com-
petitive advantages successfully to support such a dramatic rise in Shenhua will
provide a significant indicator of China’s capacity to implement its industrial policy
of building large firms, known in China as the ‘national champions’.
China’s Advantages in Building Big Business in the Coal Industry
First, China is an immense country with abundant resources. Although the per
capita amount of these resources in proportion to its 1.2 billion population is
small, in many sectors the national total is huge. The government can make use
of the country’s abundant and diverse resources to support the growth of its big
business. In Shenhua’s case, the government gave a mandate to Shenhua to extract
coal from the Shenfu Coalfield, whose total recoverable reserve is as much as
223 billion tons, with estimated reserves of 1000 billion tons. This compares with
a national total of 1100 billion tons of recoverable coal reserves. Shenhua is there-
fore planned as China’s most important future coal base as north and central
China’s coal is substantially depleted.
Secondly, the fact that China’s state-owned businesses still occupy a central
position in the economy is usually seen as a disadvantage by privatization advisors,
this nonetheless gives the government a powerful weapon for restructuring indus-
trial assets.3 To follow closely the model of the world’s leading coal producers,
Shenhua was designed with a dedicated railway to ship coal from the Shenfu
Coalfield to a dedicated port facility. It was also assigned dozens of power plants
from SPC to consume millions of tons of coal from Shenhua itself.
The construction of Shenhua based on such a design required approval and
coordination from more than four ministries and six local governments, which
are either responsible for the coalfield, local land, or the infrastructure. As the
Table 4. The output, sales revenue and profit of Shenhua Group from 1998 to 2002
Year Coal output (Mt) Coal sales (Mt) Coal
export
(Mt)
Rail
freight
(Mt km)
Port
(Mt)
Electricity
generation
(Mkwh)
Sales
revenue
(million
yuan)
Profit
(million
yuan)
Without
FWBs (1)
With
FWBs
Without
FWBs
With
FWBs
(2) (3)
1998 7.13 13.75 9.24 14.69 2,395 330 2,422 51.61
1999 11.20 18.40 14.12 20.42 3,669 340 3,879 43.91
2000 24.12 37.54 25.22 38.59 7.5 10,554 16,190 14,099 176
2001 35.86 52.74 40.20 56.02 18 19,167 20,490 19,900 1,573
2002 45.02 77.33 57.10 77.73 20 31,966 16.53 23,860 25,720 3,158
Notes: (1) FWBs¼Five Western Bureaus. (2) The data hereafter refer to those of Shenhua Group as
a whole. (3) The port started to operate in 2002.
Sources: Shenhua Group Annual Reports, from 1998 to 2001; Shenhua Group memos; Chen (2003).
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state is the ultimate owner of all of these properties, and also the ultimate adminis-
trator of all levels of government departments and local governments, it was there-
fore able more easily to grant Shenhua the use of all the properties and to ensure
better coordination among all government departments. It would have been
much more difficult for a private individual to coordinate these complex provincial,
regional and departmental interests. So far this is the only Chinese coal group to
achieve this sort of economy of scope with correspondingly low transaction costs.
Thirdly, big business needs large investment. Capital shortage is a major con-
straint for developing countries in trying to build large, capital-intensive enterprises.
Although China is relatively poor compared with other well-developed countries,
it can concentrate dispersed funds for important collective ventures. The large
amount of savings and foreign direct investment (FDI) can help meet China’s
huge investment demand. In Shenhua’s case, the Chinese government granted
the Shenhua project preferential loans of over US$9.2 billion during its construc-
tion period from 1985 to 2005. This made it the third largest investment project
in China and one of the world’s largest overall. This compares with a figure of
US$1.1 billion for China’s total investment in the coal sector in 2001 (CSD,
2002, p. 53).
Fourthly, possessing advanced technology is another determinant of the success
of big business. China’s coal industry is relatively backward by global comparison,
but this does not prevent the government from importing advanced equipment for
Shenhua. In addition to having more than 98% of its equipment imported, Shenhua
has installed a reliable automated dispatching system for underground mining.
Much labour has thereby been saved. This illustrates another very significant
support from the government, which not only provided huge investment, but
also, exceptionally, allowed Shenhua to replace labour with imported equipment.
This provoked a big debate on whether China should still make use of its compara-
tive advantage of cheap labour and avoid possible social turbulence caused by the
large redundancy resulting from the use of advanced equipment. Or should it,
instead, seek to improve productivity by using advanced technology and equip-
ment as early as possible in order to compete with the giant coal companies? In the
end, the latter view prevailed, which was demonstrated by the fact that Shenhua’s
principal coal-mine – Daliuta – has already been established as one of the most
advanced in the world, with the highest productivity record – 118 tons per employee
per day – in the world in 2002.
Fifthly, core business with high potential demand is another key to the success
of big business. Shenhua’s high quality low sulphur and low ash coal is in great
demand. In addition, the government also supports Shenhua as a pioneer in China
in the development of coal liquefaction.4 This is currently unnoticed but potentially
extremely important for both China and the world’s economy. In 1993, China
became a net oil importer and it is forecast to import 100 million tons of oil in
2010. In line with the strategy of not allowing foreigners to control its oil industry,
the government strongly supports Shenhua as the operator of the programme by
awarding almost all the nation’s fund for ‘substituting coal for oil’ to Shenhua.
As the cost may be controlled below $20 per barrel, the market for Shenhua’s
oil products should have a promising future. Chairman Ye is confident that, by
2020, Shenhua should be more like an oil producing company than a purely coal
company.
Finally, under China’s centralized and hierarchical political system, millions
of officials and public servants are still appointed by the organizational departments
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of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The central government appointed
Ye Qing to be Shenhua’s Chairman, Chief Executive and Party Secretary. For
over a decade, from 1986 to 1998, Ye was former deputy director of the State
Planning Commission (SPC) in charge of energy and communication. This back-
ground determines his suitability to manage Shenhua because the structure of
this conglomerate requires both the authority and ability to coordinate all sectors
in so many regions. In fact, Ye’s powerful leadership in Shenhua since 1998 is
the key to Shenhua’s success.
Ye’s leadership is demonstrated by his successful merging of the two formerly
parallel companies, Shenfu and Dongshen Coal Companies, which resulted in
the reduction in the number of employees, the minimization of social welfare expen-
diture, and lower production costs. Ye also implemented a succession of internal
management reforms. Moreover, through Ye’s effective coordination of Shenhua
with the Ministries of Railway and Communication, the military and local govern-
ments, Shenhua’s railway and port construction was completed in 2001, two years
ahead of schedule, which saved Shenhua 40 yuan per ton of coal in freight costs.
Building Globally Competitive Big Business allows China to Restructure
the Domestic Market and Participate Fully in the World Market
We have seen that China’s objectives in building big business are to restructure
industry in order to achieve economies of scale and scope domestically, and to
improve China’s capability to compete with the global giants. Shenhua has made
obvious progress in respect to both of these objectives.
The Chinese government has been trying to close TVE coal-mines in order to
pursue a policy of economy of scale by force since 1998, and this has incurred
strong resistance. However, Shenhua was successfully able to ‘close’ some TVE
mines: Shenhua leases the right to extract coal from the TVE mine at a fee of
10 yuan per ton. Local governments keenly supported the lease as they were able
to receive much more significant income than by doing nothing, which not only
enabled local governments wholeheartedly to close TVE coal-mines, but also funda-
mentally reduce rural poverty. Shenhua’s leasing of two TVE coal-mines in Baode
County of Shanxi province has promoted Baode’s revenue from 27 million yuan
in 2000 to 68 million yuan in 2002 and an expected 100 million yuan in 2003.
This increase has assisted Baode in eliminating age-old poverty (Ye, 2003).
Shenhua also made great progress in pursuing its economy of scale and scope
(see Table 4) based on its core coal business and supporting rail, port, power and
future coal liquefaction businesses. It is the consequential low price of coal that
enabled her to share an increasing amount of the coal export market with the
most powerful global suppliers such as BHP Billiton.
Compared with the global coal giants, Shenhua is currently still small. However,
its competitive potential is large. Apart from the advantages analysed above, sev-
eral features of the global coal industry could assist Shenhua in catching up. These
include the fact that the level of consolidation in the industry is still low (no single
company accounts for more than around 5% of total global coal production); the
industry is relatively competitive, compared to sectors such as aerospace, oil and
petrochemicals; leading global companies in the mining sector do not rely mainly
on research and development for competitive advantage; firms in this sector do
not establish competitive advantage through large outlays on building a global
brand name; the capital goods necessary to operate large modern coal-mines are
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easily available from specialist mining equipment companies, without any restriction
on technical transfer; and finally, labour intensive operation and geographical loca-
tion provide China with advantages over Australia and Indonesia in exporting to the
world’s biggest coal importing markets – Japan and Korea.
Constraints on Building China’s Big Business
Shenhua’s immense potential cannot disguise the huge difficulties that China’s
government still faces in building its big businesses. Shenhua itself illustrates
many of these problems and constraints. The fundamental problem is rooted
in China’s low level of development, which means that Shenhua cannot focus
purely on fighting the global giants or profit making, but has to share social
responsibility with the government, to look after loss-making SOE mines, and
to contend with tens of thousands of TVE mines struggling for their survival.
The central government’s decision to force Shenhua to take over the Five
Western Bureaus in 1998 was precisely because the central government could
not accept the subsidies requested by the Inner Mongolian government as a con-
dition to accept the five unprofitable Bureaus. As a result, Shenhua’s entire con-
figuration was transformed overnight and its competitive capacity drastically
limited. The Five Western Bureaus brought with them about 60,000 employees,
huge liabilities, and outdated facilities and technology, compared with Shenhua’s
22,000 employees, substantial profits, and world-class equipment and
technology.
The central government failed to control the entry of TVE coal-mines into the
mainstream of the coal industry due to their contribution to relieving local poverty.
As a result, the surplus coal market became a major constraint on the market expan-
sion of the big coal groups.
The capital resources of China’s big groups are too small. Shenhua was financed
almost entirely by loans, with a tiny capital fund. Shenhua has to repay loans and
interest totalling 31.4 billion yuan from 2001 to 2010, an average of 3.14 billion
yuan each year, and four billion yuan in the peak year. One third of Shenhua’s
coal production cost was for repaying loans and interests to the bank. This severely
compromises the competitive position of Shenhua coal and handicaps its further
expansion.
Finally, Shenhua is also constrained by other weaknesses that are common
to all SOEs: namely the social welfare burden, overstaffing and unconstrained
government intervention. Moreover, Shenhua’s achievements appear to owe a
great deal to the qualities of its leader, Ye Qing. However, Ye is already
over 70 years old. It is far from certain that he will be replaced by an equally
effective leader.
Shenhua’s problems are not unique, but reflect the typical problems for all
the large groups in China as acknowledged by the SPC (1996, 1999). Obviously,
the degree to which China can build its own indigenous big business very much
depends on the degree to which the government can eliminate or reduce these
constraints. China’s SOEs have large workforces and still provide the social
welfare safety net, neither of which can be reduced or replaced overnight. TVEs
were supposed to be closed more easily and faster, but this view was proved
wrong. TVEmines fiercely resist closure and the local governments doggedly protect
them.
110 P. Nolan & H. Rui
New trim(248174) (V 7.51g) [6.4.2004–2:05pm] [97–113] [Page No. 110] {TandF}Rcea/RCEA-02_02_01.3d (RCEA) RCEA-02_02_01
Conclusion: Implications of China’s Building Indigenous Big Business
In view of the dramatic impact of the global big business revolution, indigenous and
competitive big business in China can only be built through powerful and effective
government action. Even though China’s industrial policy is still fragmented and
is guilty of many errors, its positive effects on her economy and society can be clearly
seen from the example of Shenhua.
In general, large enterprises performed much better than medium and small
enterprises in terms of their turnover and profits (e.g. see Jefferson et al., 2003).
For example, in 2000, the 515 key state enterprises made profits of 225.3 billion
yuan, accounting for 98% of total SOEs profits (i.e. the other SOEs in total
almost made no profits) (SETC, 26 February 2001). In 2002, the 510 key state
enterprises made profits of 280 billion yuan (SETC, 2003a), accounting for
104% of total SOEs’ profits in 2002 (i.e. the other SOEs were loss-making)
(SSB, 2003). Key enterprises have obviously become the backbone of the national
economy, while they also play a leading role in local economies:
In 2001, Guangdong province had 41 key enterprises, accounting for
0.2 percent of the provincial total, but their sales revenue, profit and
assets accounted for 18.5, 21.5, and 31 percent respectively; Jilin province
had 14 key enterprises, accounting for 0.5 percent of the provincial total,
but their sales revenue, profit and assets accounted for 43.3, 34.7 and 27.4
percent respectively. Moreover, in 2001 China’s key enterprises performed
better than the Global 500 firms in terms of their 7.6 percent of sales
revenue annual increase while the latter decreased by 0.4 percent, and
of their 3.8 percent higher proportion of profit revue. (SETC, 2002)
In the coal industry, the positive effect of the government’s industrial policy
is reflected not only in Shenhua’s case, but also in the entire industry. The industry
turned a loss into a profit of 1.51 billion yuan for the coal sector in 2001, basically
because of the profit contribution of 1.5 billion yuan from 25 key coal corporations.
In 2002, 32 out of 33 key coal enterprises made a profit totalling 2.33 billion yuan
(SETC, 2003b).
However, there are many constraints to the implementation of China’s indus-
trial policy and the construction of large globally competitive corporations.
Domestically, China has lagged behind the advanced economies in both technology
and management for a whole century. It is also a poor, regionally and sectorally
unbalanced country – factors that have severely handicapped large firms in catching
up with their international competitors. Since the reform in 1980s China has had
to face three intertwined challenges from development, transition and globalization,
which have deeply embarrassed the government. On the one hand, the government
has demonstrated its ambition to build indigenous big business, but on the other it
has to discount this ambition in order to save SOEs and TVEs. However, the impli-
cation is not that the government should give up its industrial policy, but improve
its effectiveness by dealing better with the numerous conflicts of interest.
Regarding the industrial policy itself, the first issue is how to select and to
identify ‘strategic’ industries. Should the government give up those sectors that
are strategically important but in which it may be incapable of building globally
competitive large firms at present, such as aerospace? Should the government
concentrate all its efforts on those industries that are strategically important and
in which it may be feasible to build global giants, such as the coal industry?
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These considerations suggest that the second issue is how to set different policies for
different industries. In the case of China’s coal industry, numerous matters require
a well-designed industrial policy – from entry control, resource allocation, regula-
tion of controlling rents and royalty on one hand, to the building of large corpora-
tions and the control of foreign investment on the other.
Postscript
On 16 July 2003, 13 days after our second interview with Mr Ye Qing, the
Department of Organization of the Chinese Communist Party announced that
Mr Ye was stepping down from the position of chairman and Party Secretary of
Shenhua. The current president, Mr Chen Biting, was nominated as his successor.
It was emphasized that this is a normal leadership change, based on the regulations
about age limits for SOE top managers (Shenhua Group, 2003).
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Notes
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the data in this paper are based on our current research project of ‘The
impact upon China’s coal industry of the global value chain cascade effect’, and our previous research
project of the Chinese Big Business Programme.
2. China’s manufacturing sector overall consumes 60% of its energy (most as coal and electricity) and
64% of its steel.
3. Many of Europe’s leading firms (e.g. Arcelor, EADS, Renault, ENI, Rolls-Royce and BAe Systems)
had their origins in massive restructuring of state-owned firms.
4. Coal liquefaction is a technology through which coal is transformed to oil.
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